2 obligation by FY 2018. 5 From that year forward the state will be constitutionally required to make the full payment to its pension systems each year as calculated by plan actuaries. The state reports that its pension systems are underfunded by $44.7 billion, when liabilities are discounted at the 8.25 percent annual return that New Jersey predicts it can achieve on funds' investment portfolios.
However, when plan liabilities are calculated in a manner consistent with private sector accounting requirements, methods that economists almost universally agree are more appropriate, 6 New Jersey's unfunded benefit obligation rises to $173.9 billion. 7 This amount is equivalent to 44 percent of the state's current GDP 8 and 328 percent of its current explicit government debt. This calculation applies a discount rate of 3.5 percent (the yield on Treasury bonds with a maturity of 15 years) to reflect the nearly risk-free nature of accrued benefits for workers. It is estimated if state pension assets average a return of 8 percent, New Jersey will run out of funds to meet its pension obligations in 2019. If asset returns are lower than 8 percent, they will run out of funds sooner. 9 State actuaries estimate that under certain assumptions, New Jersey's pension plans will run out of assets to make benefit payments beginning in 2013.
10 5 http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/nj-pension-reform-bills-approved-by-senate-committee 6 Current public sector pension accounting rules effectively violate well-accepted economic precepts such as the Modigliani-Miller results in corporate finance, the Black-Scholes formula for options pricing, and the general "law of one price."
7 Authors' calculations. Waring (2008) finds that the mid-point of a public pension's stream of future benefit payments is around 15 years in the future. Thus, a lump sum payment 15 years hence can be treated as an approximation of the annual benefit liabilities owed by a plan. Following Rauh and Novy-Marx, we compound the reported present value liability forward for 15 years at the expected rate of return, then discount back to the present at the Treasury interest rate. Waring, M. Barton, "Liability-relative investing," Journal of Portfolio Management 30(4). 10 According to New Jersey's actuarial reports, the state PERS plan will run out of assets to make its benefit payments in 2013. The plans for teachers (TPAF), judges (JRS), and local PERS employees will run out of assets between 2014 and 2015. The Police and Firemen's plans and the State Police Plan run out of funds between 2018 and 2019. This calculation is based on the assumptions that the plans experience no gains from investment income, no state and employee contributions, and no changes to the size of benefit payments.
Given the costs and risks inherent in the defined benefit plan to taxpayers, as well as the political incentives for legislators to overpromise benefits to public sector workers while shirking on the state's contributions, the state should close the current defined benefit plan to new workers and expand the existing defined contribution plans for all new state and local workers. Shifting employees to a defined contribution plan would ensure that New Jersey's pension system for its public sector workforce is sustainable in the long term and reward younger workers with a guaranteed employer contribution to their individual retirement.
New Jersey currently operates two defined contribution plans. The Alternative Benefit Plan (ABP) serves 17,000 faculty and administrative staff in the state's universities and colleges. In addition, in 2007 the state established the Defined Contribution Retirement Program (DCRP) with limited eligibility for elected and appointed officials and current participants in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) and
Teachers' Pension Annuity Fund (TPAF). Either could serve as a model for a future defined contribution plan for all public sector employees.
To fund the debt owed to current DB participants, the state must take immediate action. This includes some or all of the following: capping salaries, increasing employee contributions, reducing the rate of the accumulation of future benefits, reducing annual cost of living adjustments (COLAs), and increasing the retirement age. These measures will reduce the size of the future benefits-funding burden and thus enable the state to better manage its pension obligations to employees vested in the system.
The alternative is to continue the DB gamble-promising benefits to public sector workers while concealing the size of that obligation to taxpayers. The current level of underfunding indicates that New
Jersey will have a difficult-to-impossible task in keeping its commitments to current public sector workers. To continue adding workers and liabilities to the defined benefit plans is not tenable and represents a promise that the public cannot afford.
I. Public Sector Pensions: the Defined Benefit Plan
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There are two general types of retirement plans: defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.
Most state and local governments in the United States offer defined benefit pension plans to their workers.
Under a defined benefit (DB) plan, the employer promises employees a regular pension payment (i.e., an annuity) over the worker's retirement years. 11 The amount of the benefit payment depends on the worker's age, years on the job, and a measure of their final salary. 12 More specifically, benefit formulas generally pay a given percentage of the employee's final salary multiplied by the number of years of employment. In a defined benefit plan, investment risk is borne by the employer since the employer's payment is independent of the investment return earned by the pension's fund.
In a defined contribution plan (DC), workers and employers make contributions to an investment account, such as a 401(k), 403(b), or the federal Thrift Savings Plan. Workers own and generally manage these accounts and bear the tradeoffs between risk and reward entailed by the investments they choose.
Because defined benefit retirement payments are guaranteed by state laws or constitutions but financed with a portfolio of risky investments subject to market risk, defined benefit plans present a distinct fiscal risk to taxpayers. Defined benefit plans obligate the employer to pay out benefits regardless of the financial status of the pension system when the employee retires. Current actuarial practice and accounting standards have contributed to a systematic underestimation of the size of the obligation owed to public sector employees, creating a moral hazard problem. Legislators are able to overpromise benefits, often negotiated by public sector unions, while passing the cost of these promises on to future taxpayers. Comparing plan liabilities and assets allows actuaries to determine the degree to which the plan is funded and able to pay out promised benefits. Actuaries calculate two basic measures of pension plan performance. These are the funding ratio-the plan's assets divided by the plan's liabilities-and the unfunded liability-the plan's assets minus the plan's liabilities. Plans that are 100 percent funded and have no unfunded liabilities are considered "fully funded."
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How Reliable Is the ARC? The Role of Actuarial Methods
According to the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the ARC is to be calculated so that it covers annual benefit accruals and spreads any unfunded liability over a 30-year amortization period.
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One practice that has contributed to the pension funding gap is the selection of an improper discount rate when valuing pension plan liabilities. Discounting allows one to value a future benefit in today's dollars. It asks, "How much is needed to put into the pension system today in order to pay out a promised benefit in the future?" According to the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) ruling 25 and Actuarial Standards of Practice (ASOP) item 27, public pension liabilities are to be discounted by the expected rate of return on pension assets. Typically public pension funds assume they will earn nominal returns of around 8 percent annually, using this interest rate to discount future benefit liabilities back to the present.
However, most economists believe this approach to be fundamentally flawed, running contrary to both financial theory and the practice of financial markets, which hold that the means by which a liability is financed is irrelevant to the value of that liability. Discounting public sector pension liabilities at the expected rate of return on pension assets violates a number of economic precepts, including:
• The Modigliani-Miller theorem, which holds that the value of an investment project is independent of how it is financed;
• The Black-Scholes options pricing formula, which shows that guarantees against market risk grow more expensive over long periods and when the underlying asset is more volatile (public pension accounting holds that long-time horizons justify ignoring market risk and that holding riskier, higher-returning assets improves a pension's funding level);
• The Arrow-Lind theorem, which holds that governments can ignore the risk of investments only when the investments are small relative to and uncorrelated with the size of the tax base; and
• The general "law of one price," which holds that two investments producing similar income streams should carry similar prices (public pension accounting implies that governments can produce the same level of pension benefits at roughly half the cost of a private firm).
For consistency with economic theory, the practice of financial markets, and rules applied to private sector firms, liabilities should instead be valued according to the risk inherent in those liabilities. To do otherwise implies limitless possibilities for riskless arbitrage, producing potentially absurd results.
22
From the perspective of workers, defined benefit pensions in the public sector are risk-free; they are guaranteed benefits by the state, which has the power to tax. This means, of course, that from the perspective of the taxpayer, the liability is a near-certainty. The discount rate chosen to value future 21 Kohn, Donald L., "Statement at the National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems Annual
Conference." New Orleans, Louisiana, May 20, 2008, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20080520a.htm liabilities in the plan, therefore, should reflect the low-risk character of the benefits promised to workers.
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From the government's perspective, it is appealing to use a higher discount rate to estimate plan liabilities because it produces a lower annual contribution. By contrast, a low discount rate will result in a higher annual contribution required by the employer (in this case, the government) to fund pension obligations.
Over 25 Even if plans accurately predicted average market returns over a very long period, the majority of plans' obligations are payable over the next 15 years, in which average market returns would be more uncertain. There is a significant possibility-and in some cases, a probability-that a "fully funded" plan would be unable to meet its obligations even if the plan accurately projected average market returns.
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In addition to understating funding requirements, using a high discount rate to value public pension liabilities encourages plan managers to invest in higher risk portfolios in order to target the expected rate of return, producing bad incentives in the management of pension assets. 27 Instead, financial theory suggests pensions should be discounted according to the lower risk (and lower return) Treasury bond rating of 3.5%.
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When applying a much lower discount rate, based on the return on Treasury bonds, the size of pension obligations is far larger than state estimates, 29 rising from $2.8 trillion nationwide to $5.2 trillion. 30 In other words, the size of the obligation owed to public sector workers will require a far larger contribution than current actuarial reports would suggest.
Boom and Bust: Pension Asset Investments
By assuming a higher rate of return on pension assets investments, states pursued investment strategies that favored higher-risk, higher-volatility investments. 31 Before the 1980s most systems held their assets mainly in fixed-income securities. Investment choices were restricted by legal lists. In the 1980s legal lists were replaced with the "prudent person" rule. 32 Moving to this standard allowed pension systems, as long as standards of diversification and prudence were met, to hold larger percentages of equities and capture the higher returns being generated in a booming market.
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During boom years the effect of high returns on pension assets may have induced other behavioral changes in the management of pension assets and encouraged more risk taking with pension assets.
Because the I.R.S. code states that "no part of plan assets may be used for purposes other than the exclusive benefit of employees and beneficiaries" the guaranteed benefit coupled with the workers' claim on surpluses compound the moral hazard problem in the management of public pensions. Where accounting methods base pension asset valuations on a high-risk expected rate of return, political pressure may result in excess surpluses of pension assets being distributed to public employees as enhanced benefits. This magnifies the incentive to take risks in pension asset investments in order to apply surpluses as expanded benefits, particularly in plans that have heavy employee representation.
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This is borne out in the changing makeup of public pension assets investments. Following the advent of the "prudent person" rule, these investments have increasingly been invested in higher-return and higher-risk vehicles.
In 1990, 40 percent of public sector pension assets were held in equities, rising to 70 percent in 2006, roughly 10 percent higher than the allocation of pension assets to equities in private pension systems. In the case of many state pension plans, governments may choose to pay less or more than the ARC.
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The ARC is a recommendation, not a requirement. As we outlined above, ARCs calculated under current pension accounting rules are inadequate to guarantee that plans can meet their obligations. And many state governments fail to pay even the ARCs that are calculated, leaving plan funding well short of what is truly needed. The result is greater costs and greater risk shifted onto future taxpayers.
The amount contributed to the pension system by the government is the employer contribution, sometimes referred to as the statutory contribution. In many states, the annual contribution made to pension systems has been below the ARC. These choices made by many state governments include putting off payments into the pension system-pension deferrals or "pension holidays"-contributing less than the ARC in order to expand spending in other areas or to avoid tax increases, and awarding increases in retirement benefits for public sector employees in lieu of salary increases. All of these result from the incentives facing the employer-the state-as pension plan steward.
In the private sector the employer may also pass on the risk of an underfunded pension plan. Private 14 the performance of plan assets. The risk is transferred from the employer (or in the case of the public sector, the taxpayer) to the employee. In a DC plan, the employer's financial obligation ceases when the required contribution is made to the individual employee's retirement plan.
The risks borne by the employer in a defined benefit pension are one reason why, beginning in the 1970s, the private sector began to switch to offering its employees defined contribution plans. Between 1979 and 1998, the share of employees covered by DB plans fell by 17 percent and the share of those covered by DC plans rose by 12 percent.
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A second reason that the private sector switched to the DC system is that it offers employees greater mobility. Benefits are less "portable" in a DB system. In most DB systems, an employee's accrued benefits depend on their final salary at the time they terminate employment. If an employee moves jobs multiple times to different pension systems and has multiple DB accrued benefits, the total of all vested benefits is less than what the benefits would be if the employee stayed in one system. 42 Once vested in a particular defined benefit pension plan, the employee risks losing a significant amount of benefit income by terminating too early or moving around too often. 43 This makes DB pensions less attractive to younger, more mobile workers that employers might wish to attract. 
Can a State "Catch Up"?
If state pension plans were frozen today with no new employees eligible for benefits, would states be able to catch up to their obligations to current beneficiaries? With lower asset values than in prior years and rising numbers of retirees, states now face difficult policy options as they attempt to catch up on pension funding contributions during a period of prolonged decreases in revenues, even as employees continue to accrue rights to future benefits. Since states are either constitutionally or statutorily obligated to pay out benefits, the size of that underfunding means that either benefit amounts and salaries must be reduced, taxation must be significantly increased, or states may be faced with a defaultscenario.
II. Case Study -New Jersey
The State of New Jersey operates five defined benefit pension plans. 44 These include the Teachers
Pension Annuity Fund (TPAF), the Police and Firemen Retirement System (PFRS), Public Employees
Retirement System (PERS), State Police Retirement System (SPRS), and the Judicial Retirement System (JRS).
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In total, New Jersey's five active defined benefit plans cover 770,869 workers. In FY 2010 the plans paid out $5.85 billion to 265,296 retirees and beneficiaries.
The actuarial assumptions used to value New Jersey's pensions include an assumed rate of return on 
How Pensions Have Been Managed and Promised in NJ
The implicit debt facing New Jersey in its underfunded pension plans, as with most states, was encouraged by the actuarial methods used to value the plans and the choices of legislators over a period of years to extend generous benefits while deferring payments to the pension funds. More stringent accounting rules would have encouraged greater funding and more restrained benefit growth over time. These gains were temporary, the results of assumption changes rather than reality. The switch in methodology and changed assumptions led to an underestimation of contribution amounts, producing a funding gap. To close the gap, in 1997 The Pension Security Plan permitted the state to issue $2.8 billion in pension obligation bonds which were used to partially eliminate a $4.25 billion unfunded liability that had surfaced. 51 The proceeds of the bond sale were deposited into the pension system. plans' common stock allocations. 53 The boom in high-tech stocks during the late 1990s coupled with the pension bond gave the temporary appearance of a fully funded plan.
Once excess assets were exhausted, the pension quickly returned to its underfunded status. Pension deferrals also weakened the system. While deferring payments provides short-term budgetary relief to state and local governments, it also creates a fiscal illusion. In the short-term, governments adjust their behavior, dedicating revenues meant for the pension system to other areas. When scheduled contributions resume, governments find they are unable to pay the full amount because they have However, these changes to benefits would apply only to newly-hired public employees. Current workers, even those who recently entered the job rolls, would be able to continue under the current benefit formula for the rest of their careers.
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These measures will help at the margins but do little or nothing to address the size of the liability that has already been accrued. The rate of accrual of benefits will have to be reduced further, and employees will have to contribute more to their plans. The state must recognize that adding more workers to a system that is underfunded by $173 billion by market standards, representing over 40 percent of New Jersey's GDP, is not a tenable option. Alternately, COLA payments could be limited to the currently projected rate of 1.8 percent per year, based on the formula where COLAs are equal to 60 percent of the change in the Consumer Price Index.
This would limit plan payouts in the case inflation were to exceed projected rates.
3) Transition non-vested workers to the DC plan. Currently, there are 274,380 workers who are not yet vested in their benefits. These workers should be shifted to the defined contribution plan. The switch will accomplish two objectives. It will guarantee new workers with a current contribution to their retirement. And in the long run, it will replace the DB system with one that is sustainable while shifting risk away from the taxpayer and removing the moral hazard associated with the state's management and stewardship of public worker investments.
According to state actuarial reports, between 5 and 18 percent of accrued benefits are not yet vested.
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Shifting non-vested employees to a DC plan could reduce these liabilities, even if employee contributions to the DB plan were partially or fully refunded. Younger employees often prefer DC plans over DB pensions for reasons of portability, so it may be possible to come to an agreement with current non-vested employees. Such a change could significantly reduce plan liabilities while more quickly moving to a sustainable pension financing model.
These steps would not significantly reduce current pension liabilities. Accrued pension benefits, be they in the private sector or the public sector, are rarely reduced to any significant extent. However, shifting employees to a defined contribution system and/or reducing benefit accrual rates for employees who remain in the defined benefit programs would better insure that unfunded liabilities do not continue to grow over time. When the programs' unfunded liabilities are capped, the state can better plan how to 60 This calculation is based on a model of the Social Security population and so could differ somewhat based on the characteristics of public sector employees and retirees. The reduction in plan liabilities is roughly linear and so could be scaled up or down. 61 The percentages are 4.6 percent for PERS, 5.5 percent for SPRS, 12.5 percent for JRS, and 18 percent for PERS.
No value is reported for TPAF, though we can infer that it lies within that range.
23 pay off these debts over time. Without reforms, though, it is likely that unfunded pension obligations will continue to grow, eventually to an unsustainable level.
Conclusion
Public sector pension plans around the country face significant funding shortfalls, facilitated by accounting practices that understate true liabilities and state and local governments that often failed to meet their financial obligations even under these more permissive accounting standards. When measured on a market valuation basis, which is required of private sector plans and which economists universally believe to be the appropriate standard, public sector pensions nationwide are underfunded by more than $3 trillion. State and local governments around the country face massive fiscal consolidations as these bills come due.
New Jersey's public pensions are emblematic of pension funding problems across the country. Over the past two decades, New Jersey's plans loosened accounting standards and increased investment risk while the government often failed to meet its required contributions. As a result, New Jersey plans are underfunded by more than $100 billion on a market valuation basis. New Jersey has recently passed reforms that would increase funding and reduce benefits for newly-hired public employees. These steps are useful but must go much further if a potential fiscal crisis is to be averted.
We outline several steps New Jersey policymakers may consider. First, all newly hired employees should be shifted to a defined contribution pension model based upon the plan already offered to New Jersey's university employees. A defined contribution model is more attractive to the young, mobile employees state governments seek to attract and provides a clear measure of the state's funding obligations.
Second, current reforms lowering pension replacement rates should be continued and, if possible, extended to current employees. All vested benefits should be honored, but the rate at which future benefits are earned should be reduced. Such a change is commonplace in the private sector and there is no reason public employees should be exempted from such changes.
Third, New Jersey pensions should consider reductions or freezes in COLA payments, which could reduce future benefit liabilities and spread the burdens of reform more evenly between taxpayers, newly hired employees and current employees, and retirees.
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Finally, current employees who are not yet vested in their benefits might be shifted along with newly hired employees to a defined contribution plan. This step could produce savings to existing DB plans while moving more quickly to a sustainable pension model for public employees.
Additionally, New Jersey's pension reports contain useful and detailed information on plan liabilities and the distribution of benefits by age, experience, and earnings. However, these reports can be improved, in particular by making publicly available a more detailed analysis of the assumptions involved in projecting investment returns in the pension assets portfolio. Most public pension financial and actuarial reports make only a cursory effort to justify their investment return assumptions. This is particularly important given the crucial role the discount rate plays in public pension accounting.
